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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between training on abstraction and 
the comprehension of logic rules. In order to evaluate the possibility of improvement on 
logic performance we have selected the particular case of the DeMorgan’s laws. The 
dispute between the natural logic approach and the mental models theory is analyzed 
from the perspective of such abstraction effect. Two experiments are reported. The first 
one suggests that the presentation of a formal proof promotes a better comprehension of 
DeMorgan´s laws than the use of visual resources or colloquial examples. The second 
one offers a stronger test for the same abstraction effect. Some limitations concerned 
with the syntactic meaning of negation and the differences between constructive and 
evaluative conditions are discussed. Since the meaning of abstraction for the 
psychology of reasoning is pointed out as critical some suggestions for further research 
and possible educational applications are mentioned.  
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Reasoning and Logic Rules 
We apply logic rules every day without being fully aware of it [1]. We cannot avoid thinking in 
terms of classes or sets, or to connect elements with abstract operators like implications, negations, 
conjunctions or disjunctions. Some syllogistic figures are even so spontaneous that their cognitive 
processing occurs in an automatic way (e.g., the modus ponens reasoning rule [2]). This reasoning 
rule states that given a conditional proposition such as if p, then q (or symbolically formulated 
p→q), and another proposition that affirms p, the necessary conclusion is q [3]. This inference can 
be described as intuitive, and has been well documented in many psychological experiments [4]. 
The ubiquity of logical components in human thinking has been widely acknowledged by historical 
and current psychologies of reasoning [5]. The two dominant trends in this field –the syntactic and 
the semantic approaches to deductive thinking– agree in that logic plays a central role in human 
cognition [6]. Nevertheless, the cognitive relevance of the formal objects studied by logic for the 
understanding of human thinking is far from being agreed [5]. The syntactic or rules-driven models 
propose that logic rules are natural components of the mind [7, 2]. On the other hand, the semantic 
or meaning-driven theories suggest that the human mind has no formal rules at all, and that we 
solve logical problems by constructing some kind of mental models that only partially grasp the 
objects of logic in a fuzzy way [8, 9, 10]. Reasoning is rather a succession of images that are finally 
tested against counter-examples for the obtained conclusions [11, 12]. During the last decades, the 
psychology of reasoning has redefined its research agenda to include other issues that emphasize 
pragmatic restraints like the ecological setting [13] or the similarities between reasoning and 
decision making [4]. 
Nevertheless, in this wide and heterogeneous state-of-the-art concerned with the confluence of logic 
and psychology, the centrality of abstraction is generally recognized and acknowledged by all the 
theories of human reasoning [10, 2]. The term abstraction is here conventionally defined as the 
selective reduction of dimensions in the structuring of information about objects and events [14]. In 
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this study we suggest that the level of abstraction achieved in reasoning can be experimentally 
manipulated. Abstraction in this context can be defined as the inferential distance between a 
concrete experimental material or task and the formality of the logic rules involved in the 
experiment. Hence, the smaller the distance, the higher the abstraction level of the experimental 
material. For example, the presentation of a formal proof for a logic rule is more abstract than the 
illustration of the same rule by means of verbal sentences that apply the same formal structures in 
concrete daily propositions. Keeping in mind the meaning of abstraction proposed here, we could 
say that a formal proof is nearer to the domain of logic than any colloquial example made with 
concrete sentences about daily objects.  
In this context, the aim of the study is to contribute to the current discussion about reasoning with 
focus on the relevance of abstraction for the application of logic rules. The particular case chosen in 
this study is the pair of logic rules erroneously attributed to the British mathematician Augustus 
DeMorgan [15] concerned with the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions. Although DeMorgan 
made many transcendent contributions to mathematics and logic during the nineteenth century, 
these rules were well known by the medieval logicians [16]. One variety of DeMorgan's laws states 
two equivalences, one for the negation of conjunctions, and another for the negation of disjunctions 
[3]. Equations 1 and 2 present the DeMorgan’s laws for any propositions p and q [1], using the 
conventional symbols of negation ¬ , conjunction ∧ , disjunction  and equivalence .  ∨ ⇔( ) qpqp ¬∨¬⇔∧¬  (1) 
( ) qpqp ¬∧¬⇔∨¬  (2) 
In logic, a proposition is defined as any sentence that can be considered either true or false [3]. If 
one of these values cannot be clearly attributed, then such sentence is not a proposition [1]. The 
term proposition is used here with the same meaning attributed by Tarski [17] to the term sentence. 
An example for the Equation 1 is the formal equivalence between the following two statements: a) 
It is not true that: summers are happy (p) and winters are sad (q), b) summers are not happy ( p¬ ) 
or winters are not sad ( q¬ ). For Equation 2, an example is the formal equivalence between the 
following two statements: c) It is not true that: Fridays are short days or Mondays are long days, d) 
Fridays are not short days and Mondays are not long days. Statement a is equivalent to statement b. 
Statement c is equivalent to statement d. This equivalence is formal and does not necessary occur in 
other dimensions like the semantic or the pragmatic [9]. After the early contributions of Wason and 
Johnson-Laird [18] to the psychology of reasoning, the distinction between structure and content 
became widely accepted for arguing that rules are structural components and have a formal 
meaning, but the content is differentiable from the point of view of semantics or pragmatics.  
 
Psychological Experiments With DeMorgan´s Laws  
Many previous studies have been conducted to analyze the cognitive processing of negation [19, 
20, 2, 18]. For the particular case of DeMorgan´s laws only two previous contributions provide a 
specific experimental paradigm that makes the study of the relationship between abstraction and the 
application of logic rules easier. The first contribution referred here [21] evaluates the spontaneuos 
recognition of DeMorgan´s laws. In that study, the experimental subjects were asked to find 
equivalent colloquial expressions for certain given sentences, which were presented in capital 
letters and structured as the first part of Equations 1 and 2. Four possible equivalences were then 
presented in small letters structured as the second part of Equations 1 and 2. The experimental 
subjects were supposed to find out which sentence represented by small letters better matched the 
sentences represented by capital letters. This specific experimental task belongs to two classical 
paradigms of the psychology of reasoning: the inferential paradigm and the selection paradigm 
[12]. In the inferential paradigm some sentences are provided and the experimental subjects have to 
infer a conclusion. This is opposed to the truth table paradigm, which participants are presented 
with a rule and then they are requested to recognize its correct application [11]. In the selection 
paradigm participants are presented with a list of possible answers and they have to select the 
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option that fits a sound conclusion. The selection paradigm is opposed to the constructive 
paradigm, in which participants have to fill in the blanks with a conclusion for a given argument.  
The experiment conducted in a previous study [21] included a total of ten trials. Five were 
applications of Equation 1 and the other five applied Equation 2. No experimental manipulations 
were introduced. The results of this study showed that these laws are difficult to understand, which 
is consistent with previous findings [22] and with recent contributions [23]. The average of 
recognitions was barely between two or three out of ten [21]. Not only the correct recognitions 
were few but also the mistakes showed patterns of difficulty. The mistakes figures were random, 
especially for Equation 1. Similar results were found in a second experiment that studied the 
relationship between logic intuition and personality with the same materials and procedures [24]. In 
this second study, an extension of the first one, the main result suggests that the quality of 
introspection explains around 43% of the logical intuition of DeMorgan´s laws. This regression 
model was interpreted as a relevant link between deductive reasoning and personality traits like the 
tendency to introspection. Similar results were previously obtained by Fumero, Santamaría, and 
Johnson-Laird [25] for the relationship between personality traits and the recognition of logic rules 
like modus tollens syllogisms ( pqqp ¬⇔¬→ , ).  
The design for this study followed Macbeth et al. [21, 24], and, according to the criteria introduced 
by Wason and Johnson-Laird [18], can be classified as a sentential and evaluative variety of 
negation. The sentential negation refers to propositions in which the negation applies to the whole 
expression. Its opposite is the constituent negation, which refers to a partial negation inside the 
proposition [26]. The evaluative condition refers to the nature of the experimental task and is 
opposed to the constructive condition. The task is evaluative when the experiment provides a list of 
possible answers and subjects choose one of them. In contrast, the constructive condition offers 
only a blank space and subjects have to construct their own answers.  
The revision of these previous studies suggests that: i) the comprehension of DeMorgan´s laws is 
difficult [18], ii) the formal meaning of the rules of logic is probably less processed than their 
semantic or pragmatic dimensions [9, 10, 21, 24]. The first point motivates the experimental intent 
to generate more understanding about DeMorgan´s laws by cognitive manipulations. The second 
point suggests that the abstraction level of processing might have a critical relevance for the 
successful understanding and application of these rules. In this context, the specific aim of this 
work is to increase the recognition of these laws through the manipulation of the abstraction level 
during the experimental interventions. The working hypothesis states that more abstract 
experimental interventions promote better performances in the recognition of DeMorgan´s laws. 
This hypothesis comes from the idea that logic rules are abstract objects. Although the application 
of such abstractions occurs in more concrete worlds, an adequate comprehension of logic may 
require a controlled abstraction effort [2, 6, 7].  
 
Method 
Two experiments contributed to study the relationship between the comprehension of DeMorgan´s 
laws and the level of abstraction in which the cognitive processing is set. The aim of the first 
experiment was to generate better performances for the recognition of DeMorgan´s laws in test 
phase through the manipulation of two factors in the study phase. The first factor was the format of 
the experimental materials. Two conditions were selected for this factor: i) the presentation of a 
formal proof for the theorems in Equations 1 and 2 and, ii) the presentation of visual resources. The 
formal proof was more abstract than its visual representation by means of Venn-Euler diagrams [3]. 
The second factor was concerned with the use of colloquial daily examples. The two levels defined 
for this second factor were the use and the lack of use of examples. It is considered here that the 
lack of illustration by examples is more abstract than its actual presentation [27]. This 2x2 factorial 
design generates four experimental groups that enable statistical comparisons for interactions 
between levels of factors and between factors beyond levels distinctions [28]. The fundamental 
applied purpose of this experiment is to study which intervention promotes better understanding of 
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DeMorgan´s laws. The main conjecture proposed here states that higher abstraction promotes better 
logic rules´ comprehension. Although the opposite claim seems reasonable, i.e. that concrete 
experimental materials facilitate the access to abstract concepts, the main conjecture of the present 
study is focused on the nature of the logic rules. Such formal structures properly belong to a 
domain that is abstract per se, but also operate in other concrete domains like daily conversations. 
The central intuition of the present study suggests that cognitive training on abstraction promotes 
better performances when the same abstract rules are applied in concrete tasks because such rules 
are abstract by nature [29]. This conjecture does not imply that abstraction is the only valid 
reasoning promotion method. That educational issue requires other didactic research for specific 
teaching situations that exceeds the present study. In this context it is suggested that a formal proof 
is more abstract than the Venn-Euler diagrams. And the lack of examples is considered more 
abstract than the use of examples.  
The second experiment proposes a stronger test for the abstraction hypothesis after the analysis of 
the results of the first experiment. It focuses only on the extreme positions of a theoretical gradient 
of abstraction that goes from the most abstract manipulations to the most concrete ones. This 
second experiment seeks for a bigger effect size through the comparison between the lack of 
manipulation and the strongest manipulation obtained from the first experiment. All the variables 
included in the statistical tests of both experiments turned out to be compatible with the normality 
and homoscedasticity assumptions after Kolmogorov-Smirnov´s and Levene´s tests, respectively.  
 
Experiment 1: Improving Performance in Logic by means of Abstraction 
Sample 
A sample of 191 university students was randomly recruited at the National University of Entre 
Ríos, located in the city of Paraná, Argentina. All the recruited students were undergraduates from 
social sciences careers that exclude logic and mathematics from their study plans. An informative 
consent form was signed by each subject before taking part in the experiment and the participation 
remained anonymous. The experimental sessions were conducted in groups of around 50 subjects in 
a classroom at the same university. 53.3% of the participants (n=102) were female and the average 
age was 21.3 years (SD=1.2 years). The proportion of male and female students was homogenous in 
all the experimental groups. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
groups. The sample size of each group and the corresponding experimental manipulations are 
described in Table 1.  
Materials and procedure 
All the participants completed a study phase and a test phase. During the study phase different 
experimental interventions were implemented. An experimental task that reliably measures the 
individual performance in logic for DeMorgan´s laws was administered to all the participants 
during the test phase, right after completing the study phase. This experimental task was applied 
and psychometrically analyzed in previous studies [21, 24]. The instructions were to find an 
equivalent expression in small letters, among four given possibilities, to other expression in capital 
letters, as mentioned above. The complete evaluation includes ten trials. Five are applications of the 
law expressed in Equation 1, and the other five apply the law of Equation 2. The experiment was 
carried out in a paper and pencil format. An English translation of the original version used in 
Spanish for the experimental task is shown in Appendix 1. To perform the 2x2 factorial 
manipulations four experimental groups were defined. The first group received a formal proof of 
DeMorgan´s laws without colloquial examples. The second group received the same formal proof 
with examples. The third group received Venn-Euler diagrams instead of a formal proof and no 
examples. And the fourth one received Venn-Euler diagrams and examples. The proof and the 
diagrams were considered as levels of the format factor. The presence and the absence of examples 
were considered as levels of the example factor.  
To make it more functional, the proofs introduced as format manipulations during the study phase 
took the form of mathematical explanations about the necessary equivalence between both sides of 
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Equations 1 and 2. One proof was presented for Equation 1 and another for Equation 2. The set 
theory strategy was used for both proofs [3]. The use of symbols for the correspondence of 
propositions was determined i.e., for disjunction with union it was used , for conjunction with 
intersection it was used ∩ , and for negation with complementation it was used a line above sets [1]. 
Equations 3 and 4 introduce the proofs presented in experimental groups 1 and 2. This abstract 
proof strategy took an arbitrary element x and showed that the inclusion of this element in the first 
set implies its inclusion in the last one. The inclusion of this element in a set was expressed by the 
symbol ∈and its negation by ∉ .  
∪
)()( QPxQxPxQxPxQPxQPx ∪∈⇔∈∨∈⇔∉∨∉⇔∩∉⇔∩∈     (3) 
)()( QPxQxPxQxPxQPxQPx ∩∈⇔∈∧∈⇔∉∧∉⇔∪∉⇔∪∈     (4) 
The study phase in groups 1 and 2 lasted about ten minutes. The experimenter presented the proof 
of each equation as follows. First, he wrote Equations 3 and 4 on a whiteboard and invited the 
participants to pay attention to the sets and elements. Then he wrote the first part of Equation 3 
( QPx ∩∈ ) and indicated that an arbitrary element x belongs to the complement of the intersection 
of P and Q. After that the experimenter explained that the latter statement is equivalent to say that 
the same element x does not belong to the intersection of P and Q, and presented the second part of 
Equation 3 (i.e. ). Then he moved forward to the next step and continued the same way 
until the last step. At this moment the experimenter remarked that the element x belonging to the 
complement of an intersection in the first step is the same element belonging to the union of 
complements in the last step of Equation 3. The same strategy was applied to describe the 
inferential shift in Equation 4 for the other DeMorgan´s law. The Venn-Euler diagrams presented as 
an alternative format manipulation with less abstraction processing were introduced as a sequence 
of each step of Equations 3 and 4. And this experimental manipulation lasted more or less the same 
time. For this visual level of the format factor introduced in groups 3 and 4, no proof was given. 
Figure 1 shows a fragment of the set diagrams sequence corresponding to Equation 4. The 
shadowed sets p and q represent a union which corresponds to the disjunction operator in logic. If 
an arbitrary element x does not belong to the shadowed area in Figure 1 (second step in Equation 4), 
this is equivalent to say that this element is not in p and not in q (third step on Equation 4).  
)( QPx ∩∉
 
Figure 1  
Venn-Euler Diagram Representing the Second and Third Steps in Equation 4 
 
Hypotheses 
The experimental hypothesis H1 predicts a higher mean of correct answers for the experimental 
group 1 than for the other groups. The experimental hypothesis H2 states that the proof format 
generates a better performance than the visual format. The hypothesis H3 states that the lack of 
examples generates better performances than the use of them. Hypothesis H1 is an interaction 
conjecture that combines levels of both factors: proof presentation and no examples. Hypothesis H2 
and H3 are factorial conjectures that operate inside each factor. Only if the interaction does not 
occur, then the factor conjectures are reasonable to be tested [28]. In this way, H1, H2, and H3 
predict better performances for more abstract interventions. Thus, it is assumed that in H1 proof 
plus no examples is the most abstract intervention in this experiment, in H2 proofs are more abstract 
than  diagrams, and finally that in H3 the lack of examples is more abstract than the use of them.  
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Results and discussion 
The main results of the factorial ANOVA are presented in Table 1 and Figure 2. H1 (F=2.878, 
p=0.091, = 0.015) and H3 (F=0.038, p=0.538, = 0.002) were rejected. H2 was compatible 
with the evidence (F=5.927, p=0.016, = 0.031) with a small effect size for a partial eta squared 
bigger than 0.01 and smaller than 0.06.  
2
pη 2pη
2
pη
 
 
Table 1 
Description of the Experimental Groups and their Performance in Logic 
 
Manipulation Experimental 
Group 
Sample  
Size Format Example 
 
Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
1 47 proof no 7.55 2.64 
2 50 proof yes 8.42 1.84 
3 47 visual no 7.28 3.03 
4 47 visual yes 6.87 2.72 
 
 
Figure 2 
Recognition of DeMorgan´s Laws 
 
Note: Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval for the mean  
 
No interaction effect was found for the combination of format and example factors. Although in 
Figure 2 the highest performance corresponded to the experimental group 2, the factorial ANOVA 
did not show significance for this combination of proof plus examples. Thoroughly, a t test for the 
difference between groups 1 and 2 showed no significant differences (t=-1.883, p=0.063, Cohen´s 
d=0.384). Nevertheless, further tests with higher statistical power ideally near to 1-β=0.80 would 
probably generate significance for the observed effect size of Cohen´s d. If we accept this 
assumption, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the abstraction hypothesis. An 
abstraction effect might be postulated after this evidence. The use of formal proofs during the study 
phase generated better performances in the recognition of DeMorgan´s laws during the test phase. 
The non-significant results obtained for the example factor suggests that the use of colloquial 
illustrations for these rules does not improve comprehension. It seems that examples are 
complementary but not structural for the cognitive processing of DeMorgan´s laws. This result was 
obtained for the case of selection tasks. The experimental paradigm employed here is the inferential 
one. When an alternative paradigm was applied in previous studies (i.e. the truth tables paradigm), 
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the best performances were obtained for the experimental training on thematic schemata [27]. This 
probably means that the abstraction effect occurs in inferential paradigms but not in truth table 
paradigms. Further research is also needed to compare with the constructive condition of negation 
referred by Klima [26], in which subjects are asked to construct their own expressions instead of 
selecting one from a given list. Hence, a limitation of the present study is that only the sentential 
and evaluative conditions were analized inside the inferential paradigm.  
The format factor that obtained significance in this experiment showed a small effect size ( = 
0.031). It is suggested here that this abstraction effect needs more evaluation because the factor 
design mixes the example factor inside the statistical comparisons. Although the example factor 
resulted non-significant, it adds some variability to the comparison inside the format factor. From 
this point of view, it seems relevant to propose a stronger and clearer test for the abstraction 
conjecture. Thus, a second experiment was conducted with that aim.    
2
pη
 
Experiment 2: A Stronger Test for the Abstraction Effect Hypothesis 
Only two groups were compared in this experiment. A control group which received no treatment at 
all, and an experimental group which received the most abstract material and procedures according 
to Experiment 1. To prevent any promotion of abstraction, there was no manipulation in the control 
group. The study phase was completely omitted for this group of subjects. On the other hand, the 
experimental group received the same proof presentation as the group 1 in Experiment 1. This 
manipulation is the most abstract in a theoretical gradient of abstraction that goes from the concrete 
application of examples on one side, to the pure formality of a mathematical proof on the other side. 
The purpose of this comparison between the absence of abstraction and the highest abstraction is to 
generate a statistical significant difference between performances. This strategy can be considered 
as a stronger test for the central conjecture proposed in the present study. Technically, the specific 
aim of Experiment 2 is to produce a bigger effect size than the small partial eta squared obtained in 
Experiment 1 for the abstraction effect conjecture. It is also proposed that in Experiment 1 the 
effects were confused because of the factor design applied. In this Experiment 2, instead, the 
interventions are clear-cut and not combined. While the control group remains in a natural state, the 
experimental group receives the strongest and clearest intervention of the abstract proof strategy.  
Sample 
A new sample of 66 students was randomly recruited from the same target population as in 
Experiment 1. The students that had participated in Experiment 1 did not take part in this 
experiment. The selected participants were randomly assigned to the control group or to the 
experimental group. Similar proportions of gender and age average as for Experiment 1 were 
chosen for the Experiment 2.  
Materials and procedure 
The same materials applied in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. The control group received 
no treatment at all. Whereas the experimental group received a formal proof non-technically 
explained in the study phase. This intervention took about five minutes. In the test phase all the 
participants received the same task used in Experiment 1.  
Hypothesis 
The experimental hypothesis predicts a big effect size for the comparisons between the absence of 
treatment and the most abstract treatment for the recognition of DeMorgan´s laws. An effect size 
bigger than 0.80 Cohen´s d is suggested.  
Results and discussion 
The experimental group (mean=8.61, SD=2.57) obtained a better performance than the control 
group (mean=2.53, SD=2.62). The difference resulted significant (t=9.27, p<0.001) and the effect 
size was big (Cohen´s d=2.34). These findings suggest that the cognitive processing of DeMorgan´s 
laws for the sentential and evaluative conditions [26] inside the inferential paradigm does improve 
when the study phase is set in an abstract level. A relevant theoretical gradient of abstraction levels 
might be postulated after these findings. The proximity to concrete materials and procedures during 
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the study phase probably generates the worst performances during the test phase. Inversely, the 
proximity to the extreme abstract side of the gradient during the study phase produces the best 
performances during the test phase. A limitation in this experiment is that only the sentential and 
evaluative conditions were studied. It is recommended for further studies to test the abstraction 
conjecture in constituent and constructive conditions according to the distinction proposed by Klima 
[26] and emphasized in classical studies of reasoning by Wason and Johnson-Laird [18]. It is also 
necessary to test the abstraction effect for the truth table paradigm according to the current 
psychology of reasoning.  
 
Discussion 
The relationship between logic rules axiomatically constructed and its application in plausible 
human contexts can be considered as one of the central issues for the psychology of reasoning [2, 
4]. Another way to put forward this problem is to ask for the meaning of abstraction in human 
reasoning. Both theoretical trends in the psychology of thinking, i.e. the syntactic and the semantic, 
agree with the relevance of abstraction but disagree with the meaning of abstraction [5]. The 
present contribution suggests that the experimental materials and procedures have a critical 
relevance for the improvement in comprehension of abstract rules. DeMorgan´s laws seem to be 
better understood when the setting of the experimental tasks is previously adjusted to its proper 
level of abstraction. The presentation of a formal proof during the study phase resets the cognitive 
processes in a more adjusted environment that improves comprehension during the test phase. It is 
suggested here that mental models of the experimental subjects become more accurate and explicit 
when abstraction is experimentally controlled through materials and procedures. The deductive 
inferences that move from abstraction to concrete applications become more efficient when the 
rules have been previously processed in its natural level of abstraction. If the rules are abstract, 
their adequate understanding needs to occur in an abstract scenarios. In the concrete situations 
where theses rules are feasible and consistent, a coherent application requires previous abstract 
comprehension. A possible corollary for this abstraction conjecture suggests that many results in 
reasoning experiments might be different when the abstraction level is controlled during the study 
phase. Since this is concerned with environmental issues, the findings of the present contribution 
can be considered consistent with the ecological approach to the study of human cognition [13].  
The use of visual resources and illustrative examples to promote the comprehension of DeMorgan´s 
laws might be important for different phases of the cognitive processing. One limitation of the 
present contribution is that only one phase was implemented. A sequence of increasing abstraction 
interventions would probably lead to a better comprehension of DeMorgan´s laws. For example, 
synchronic and diachronic conditions may produce different results.  
Another important issue that remains unanswered after the present study is the possible presence or 
absence of formal rules in human cognitive architecture. Though the results obtained here favour a 
more syntactic interpretation, the core philosophical problem of rules versus images remains distant 
from this psychological experiment. The evidence collected here makes no contribution to that 
philosophical debate.  
Other limitation of the present study concerns the lack of experimental control of the truth value of 
the propositions. The truth or falseness associated to the atomic or non-compound propositions 
included in the experimental tasks was no controlled by design. Although it is well known in the 
reasoning literature that content affects reasoning [18], the experimental task of the present study 
was syntactically, but not semantically, constructed. This weakness, however, did not affect the 
occurrence of the abstraction effect. Nevertheless, further research is needed to evaluate the same 
phenomenon under semantically controlled conditions.  
A possible account for the evidence collected in the present study is concerned with a rule of thumb 
that associates the negation of conjunctions to a disjunction, and the negation of disjunctions to a 
conjunction. The experimental subjects might simply remember that the denial of and is or and the 
denial of or is and after following the step-by-step presentation of DeMorgan´s laws proofs. The 
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analytical processing of these materials during the study phase may facilitate the construction of 
such fast rules. The introduction of examples and the visual presentation for DeMorgan´s laws 
probably helps comprehension, but may not produce the direct isolation of clear-cut heuristics like 
the proposed rule of thumb. This rules of thumb conjecture can be considered compatible with the 
current theoretical trend in the reasoning literature that treats deduction and decision making as 
branches of the same cognitive architecture [4, 5].  
The abstraction effect conjectured in the present study might have didactic implications for logic 
and mathematics education. The use of more abstract materials seems to lead to a better 
understanding of DeMorgan´s laws. This result is consistent with previous experiments [29] that 
found that an abstraction strategy (i.e., alternatives generation with false premises in conditional 
reasoning) improved abstract reasoning in 9- to 19-year-olds. Because of the counter-intuitive 
aspects of this result, some further research might be recommended. It is reasonable to consider that 
different materials may be optimal for different teaching moments. Maybe the introductory phases 
need more concrete materials. The abstraction effect would probably help to achieve a deeper 
comprehension when the logic rules have already been partially understood through visual 
resources.  
 
Conclusions 
Two evidence-based conclusions can be proposed. The first one suggests that a formal proof 
presentation is the best training strategy for the improvement in the comprehension of DeMorgan´s 
laws. This effect occurs when an inferential paradigm with evaluative tasks is applied. The second 
conclusion suggests that this proof intervention seems to be more efficient than the use of visual 
diagrams or the use of colloquial examples. These empirical conclusions support an abstraction 
effect hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the level of abstraction is a critical variable for the 
study of reasoning. Because human thinking includes dynamic inferential processes that iteratively 
move through different levels of abstraction, it is important to consider the distance between the 
formality of logic rules evaluated in some reasoning experiments and the concreteness of applied 
contexts.  
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Appendix 1 
Experimental Task on Logic Performance for DeMorgan´s Laws 
 
Instructions: ten sentences in capital letters are presented below. After reading each one, please 
select one of the four possible equivalences listed in small letters. One and only one of these four 
alternatives is the correct one, and the other three are not equivalences. Please note that the 
equivalence sought is formal. That is, two sentences are equivalent when they have the same 
abstract meaning. Consider also that sentences with disjunctive connectors (when the word “or” 
appears) mean that both alternatives can happen at the same time. Or at least one is true. That is, the 
disjunctions are inclusive rather than exclusive. Please give an answer for each one of the ten 
exercises.  
 
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: WINTERS ARE SAD AND SUMMERS ARE HAPPY. 
Circle the option (a, b, c, or d) you think it is equivalent to the statement above. Follow the same 
instruction for each of the capital letter statements below.  
a. Winters are not sad and summers are not happy. 
b. Winters are not sad or summers are not happy. 
c. If winters are not sad, then summers are not happy. 
d. Winters are not sad, or summers are not happy, but not both. 
 
2. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: THE FUTURE IS TODAY AND THE PAST IS OBLIVION. 
a. If the future is not today, then the past is not oblivion. 
b. Or the future is not today, or the past is not oblivion, but not both. 
c. The future is not today and the past is not oblivion. 
d. The future is not today or the past is not oblivion. 
 
3. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: THE BAD ONES ALWAYS WIN AND LIFE IS A DREAM. 
a. The bad ones do not always win or life is not a dream. 
b. The bad ones do not always win and life is not a dream. 
c. Or the bad ones do not always win, or life is not a dream, but not both. 
d. If the bad ones do not always win, then life is a dream. 
 
4. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: NATURE IS WISE AND MAN IS A RATIONAL ANIMAL. 
a. Nature is not wise, or man is not a rational animal, but not both. 
b. If nature is not wise, then man is not a rational animal. 
c. Nature is not wise or man is not a rational animal. 
d. Nature is not wise and man is not a rational animal. 
 
5. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: TO BE IGNORANT GIVES MUCH TROUBLE AND THE BEST IS ENEMY OF THE 
GOOD. 
a. Or being ignorant does not give much trouble, or the best is not enemy of the good, but not 
both. 
b. Being ignorant does not give much trouble and the best is not enemy of the good. 
c. Being ignorant does not give much trouble or the best is not enemy of the good. 
d. If being ignorant does not give much trouble, then the best is not enemy of the good. 
 
6. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: FRIDAYS ARE SHORT DAYS AND MONDAYS ARE LONG DAYS. 
a. If Fridays are not short days, then Mondays are not long days. 
b. Or Fridays are not short days, or Mondays are not long days, but both cannot be true. 
c. Fridays are not short days or Mondays are not long days. 
d. Fridays are not short days and Mondays are not long days.  
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7. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: MAN VISITED THE MOON OR THE MOON HAS A GOOD WEATHER. 
a. Man did not visit the moon or the moon does not have a good weather. 
b. Man did not visit the moon and the moon does not have a good weather. 
c. If man did not visit the moon, then the moon does not have a good weather. 
d. Or man did not visit the moon, or the moon does not have a good weather, but not both.  
 
8. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: WITCHES DO EXIST OR VAMPIRES DO EXIST. 
a. Or witches do not exist, or vampires do not exist, but both things cannot be true. 
b. If witches do not exist, then vampires do not exist. 
c. Witches do not exist and vampires do not exist. 
d. Witches do not exist or vampires do not exist. 
 
9. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: NAPOLEON WAS RIGHT-HANDED OR JOAN OF ARC WAS LEFT-HANDED. 
a. Napoleon was not right-handed and Joan of Arc was not left-handed. 
b. Napoleon was not right-handed or Joan of Arc was not left-handed. 
c. Or Napoleon was not right-handed, or Joan of Arc was not left-handed, but both things 
cannot be true. 
d. If Napoleon was not right-handed, then Joan of Arc was not left-handed. 
 
10. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: EVERYTHING CHANGES OR NOTHING CHANGES. 
a. If it is not true that everything changes, then it is not true that nothing changes. 
b. It is not true that everything changes and it is not true that nothing changes. 
c. Or it is not true that everything changes, or it is not true that nothing changes, but both 
things cannot be true. 
d. It is not true that everything changes or it is true that nothing changes. 
 
Note: Correct answers according to DeMorgan´s laws are in bold letters.  
 
